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1  Archaeological Discourse 
‘Archaeological discourse’ in the title of this paper covers a 
wide variety of texts written by professional scholars in order 
to present the results of their research, namely archaeological 
finds and comments of all sorts regarding their interpretation, 
from standard attributions in terms of Time, Space and 
Function to more ambitious reconstructions of the human past 
on any number of levels (events, ways of life, socio-economic 
patterns, mental processes, etc.). The content and style of 
archaeological discourse in that broad sense varies according to 
the category of readers – or, more correctly, users – for whom 
it is intended. The archaeological community is one such 
category; but it is by no means the only one. Archaeological 
discourse is also produced for scholars or scientists outside that 
community, especially on the occasion of interdisciplinary 
programs in which they take part. Further, other users exist 
beyond the scientific world. Commonly designated as ‘the 
general public’, they can again be divided into different 
categories according to the context or goal of communication 
(e.g. museums, CRM, television, etc), as well as to more or less 
explicit sociocultural objectives of information transfer. No 
hierarchy is here intended between those various genres; they 
are all part of the desirable outcome of archaeological research. 
However, the considerations that follow concern mainly the 
first genre mentioned above, namely scientific papers written 
for the benefit of our colleagues in archaeology. The reasons 
for this restriction are twofold. Not all members of our 
profession share the same gifts over the whole range of 
archaeological discourse, so that some degree of specialisation 
may be preferable to the confusion of all genres in our prose. 
Secondly, the production of scientific papers in the humanities 
today raises a number of specific intellectual issues that are not 
met elsewhere; they seem sufficiently pressing to justify on my 
part a distinct treatment, despite the legitimate concerns of 
others for the production of differently targeted archaeological 
publications. 
Scientific papers in archaeology are seldom made up of 
discourse alone. They usually include graphic components of 
all sorts – drawings, photographs, maps, diagrams, etc. – that 
play an essential part in the communication from authors to 
users. A separation will be made further on between the 
information provided in this graphical form and the knowledge 
necessarily expressed in science by a textual or symbolic 
construct formulated in any given language, natural, 
mathematical or other (§3). Let us however ignore this 
distinction for a while and examine first the probable fate of 
our scholarly papers in the context of the digitalisation process 
discussed in this conference. 
2 The ‘information crisis’ revisited 
The ways of archaeological thought and discourse change 
from generation to generation. Some fifty years ago, the New 
archaeology regarded itself as innovative in both respects, in 
reaction against the so-called traditional patterns of previous 
times. A few decades later, the Post-processual school 
substituted its own modes of “reading the past” (Hodder 1986), 
eventually adding recommendations for presenting the end 
product in new narrative forms (Hodder 1989, Tilley 1989). 
Then, less than ten years ago, under the banner of a ‘cognitive 
archaeology’ to come, a return to “the well-established 
techniques of rational inquiry" was advocated, away from the 
exuberant prose of the previous decades (Renfrew 1994:9). 
Such rapid fluctuations indicate at least an enduring concern 
for the subject. My own approach has been to explore the 
structure of archaeological theories irrespective of their 
paradigmatic affiliations or claims (Gardin 1980, 1990a). The 
basic assumption is that our theoretical constructs can be 
expressed in terms of a ‘calculus’, in the computational sense 
of the word (i.e. data base + rewrite formulas), which brings 
out the differences from one to the other in the conflict of 
interpretations described by Paul Ricoeur as inescapable in the 
sciences of man (1969). A by-product of this translation 
process is a set of proposals for “a new rhetoric”, i.e. a 
reshaping of archaeological publications aimed at conveying 
their cognitive import rid of the constraints or habits of linear 
discourse (Gardin 1980:146-164). Thus, while the gain in 
conciseness and clarity remains the primary goal of that 
‘logicist’ program, practical consequences follow regarding 
possible changes in our publication patterns, in a long-term 
perspective.  
Those early proposals soon found some support in the 
acknowledgement of changes of another sort regarding our 
uses of the archaeological literature. A number of respected 
scholars now admit that the quantity of pages currently 
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produced in their respective areas of research is such that they 
are unable to read more than a fraction of it; instead, they 
consult that literature, in search of the parts that are relevant to 
their research interests of the moment – data, interpretations, 
underlying arguments, i.e. the interrelated components of 
archaeological theories which logicist analyses aim to make 
readily accessible. I have mentioned elsewhere some of the 
archaeologists who have raised this reading vs. consultation 
issue over the last decades. None of them, however, suggested 
any way to solve it beyond the usual aids to information 
retrieval – abstracts, keywords, etc. – which obviously fall 
short of our requirements. For the gist of the matter is the 
following paradox: why do we keep writing our papers as if 
they were going to be read – and ask our students to do the 
same – while admitting that such is not the actual destination of 
most of them ? Our irresolution in this respect was well 
demonstrated at a conference which took place many years ago 
under a significant title: “Scholarship and Technology in the 
Humanities” (Katzen 1991). In his introductory speech, Sir 
Anthony Kenny, then President of the British Academy, stated 
the paradox in the clearest possible way, backed by a statistical 
analysis of the Production/Consumption ratio in his own field, 
a branch of philosophical research which he modestly 
described as ‘narrow’… Yet, the outcome was a set of rather 
disastrous figures, showing that he could not hope to read more 
than a very small part of the articles directly relevant to his 
interests published in England and the US alone. His 
conclusion took the form of a question addressed to all scholars 
present in the conference: “does it make sense to operate a 
system of publishing articles whose real readership is so small 
?” (Kenny 1991:7). Most participants had been invited because 
of their applications of the new technology in various branches 
of the humanities; it is all the more surprising that none of them 
except my humble self thought fit to take up Dr. Kenny’s 
challenging question at any time in the conference.  
This leads me to the revisiting of the ‘information crisis’ 
announced in the title of this section. The phenomenon thus 
named is understood in different ways depending on the angle 
of sight (financial, editorial, institutional, etc.). To me, from a 
scientific viewpoint, the ‘crisis’ is first and foremost a bio-
cultural or evolutionary matter, which does not concern the 
humanities alone. It has been elegantly summarised in a recent 
book by Pierre Joliot, a physicist of international repute who 
teaches cellular bioenergetics at the Collège de France in Paris. 
“Researchers have not waited for the development of 
communication networks to be swamped by a flood of 
publications which exceed their capacities of assimilation. 
Even if we limit ourselves to articles published in scientific 
journals, it has long been impossible to accumulate all the 
available information in one’s own domain” (Joliot 2001: 88-
89, my translation). The reason follows: “while the 
communication and information technology develops 
explosively, the capacities of our brain to acquire, store, 
assimilate and produce information remain unchanged […] 
hence a growing inadequacy between those techniques, more 
and more efficient, and man, whose  
biological characteristics remain stable” (ibid., pp. 86-87). 
In other words, we are faced with a typically ecological 
problem: a growing production of scientific papers, on the side 
of Culture, vs. the fixed neuronal capacities of their potential 
users, on the side of Nature. Advices differ as to the causes of 
growth. Some link it to the demographic explosion of the world 
population, with its corollary though not proportional increase 
in the number of scholars active in most disciplines; others to 
the development of interdisciplinary research programs, with 
the resulting obligation to widen the range of our readings. Be 
it as it may, we seem to have no control of the growth factor, 
no more than we have any control of the development of our 
neuronal system. Yet, a popular idea is that the computer 
revolution is likely to be of help at this juncture by providing 
an artificial extension of our intellectual faculties comparable 
to the progress of our mechanical command of natural or 
material processes following the industrial revolution. 
Examples can easily be found in support of that analogy, but 
they should be accompanied by evidence of its limitations. The 
interesting point, anyhow, is that once more nothing is said or 
done in that optimistic perspective about the paradox recalled 
above. Assuming that the whole bibliographic heritage of 
archaeology was made accessible on our PCs, we would still be 
faced with the same issue, namely the design of efficient 
strategies that would enable us to locate in that immense store 
of knowledge the parts that are relevant to any number of 
research queries, notwithstanding the well-known inadequacies 
of our present forms of publication in that respect. 
3  Theories as Computational Structures 
A possible way to tackle that issue consists in devising 
alternative modes of publication, in both conceptual and 
technical terms, that take into account the evolution from 
reading to consultation processes mentioned above The logicist 
program had that goal in mind, among others, when it took 
shape in the ‘80s; a number of interim reports have been 
published since about its progress, in various languages. As it 
is likely that most participants in this conference have never 
read them, let me summarise once more the proposed changes. 
The major postulate, as recalled earlier, is that 
archaeological theories can be formulated as computational 
structures, with the two following components: (a) a data base, 
here understood as a set of declarative propositions that include 
not only descriptions of archaeological materials and their 
context, with associated archaeometric data, but also a large 
number of referential statements scattered in the thread of 
discourse to ground the successive inferential leaps that make 
up the interpretation process, from empirical observations to 
theoretical propositions, or conversely. Those statements are 
not usually regarded as ‘data’; they include first and foremost 
vast sets of analogies, more often than not declared rather than 
logically argued or mathematically computed – e.g. 
archaeological comparisons, historical or ethnographical 
precedents, etc. – as well as statements diversely attributed to 
established knowledge, common sense, more or less widely 
shared beliefs, ideologies, etc. The point to bear in mind is that 
the function of such statements in our theoretical constructs is 
formally the same as that of the data coming from field 
observations or archaeometric analyses: namely, they provide a 
basis upon which the author feels authorised to build up an 
inferential structure, without calling for explicit antecedents. A 
dividing line can and perhaps should be traced between those 
two broad classes of ‘data’ according to their source: for 
example, ‘direct observations’ vs. ‘referential knowledge’, the 
latter being introduced to make sense of the former. With or 
without this dichotomy, it is clear that a data base in this 
perspective has little to do with the same concept or expression 
in the context of documentation programs, e.g. excavation 
archives, museum catalogues, national heritage files, etc. There 
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is no sense of hierarchy in this distinction; but neglecting or 
underrating it does not help to understand the relationships that 
develop in the course of time between information and 
knowledge. (b) The second component is an inferential tree (or 
ladder) made up of rewrite formulas ‘(IF) p  (THEN) q’ 
expressing the steps observed as an author goes from one set of 
propositions to another in the argument. A bridge is thus 
established between the declarative propositions of the data 
base and the hypotheses or conclusions put forward by the 
author, through a succession of leaps from one or any number 
of levels of the argument to the next. Such a tree can be read in 
two directions, according to the order followed by the author: 
either empirico-inductive, from the data base to conclusions, or 
hypothetico-deductive, from hypotheses to the data base.  
Fig.1 is the standard ‘schematisation’ of that structure, first 
published many years ago (Gardin 1980:103), and reproduced 
several times since. No separation is made in this simplified 
picture between the two broad compartments of the data base 
{Po} distinguished above, ‘direct’ or ‘referential’. The 
intersecting lines indicate that the antecedents p of a rewrite 
formula may come from different levels of the argument. The 
unique logical operation is the modus ponens, the arrow 
connecting p and q being uninterpreted, as indeed it is in most 
discursive presentations of our inferences: we have not been 
trained to go at great lengths in eliciting the various formal 
relations that connect antecedents and consequents in natural 
logic (i.e. the logic of argument in natural language). Thus, the 
logicist analysis of archaeological theories does not pretend to 
go ‘deeper’ into their foundations and structure; it merely aims 
at rearranging their constituents in a primitive logical form that 
helps to apprehend the overall organisation of the interpretation 
process and to consult readily some of its parts without having 
to go through lengthy presentations in standard archaeological 
discourse. 
4 Computer applications 
The exercise could stop at this point, having hopefully 
satisfied our wish for more clarity and conciseness in our 
current prose. Early examples of logicist analyses were indeed 
of this kind, content with a comment of the reformulation 
process and its putative merits – as well as its limitations, to 
which I shall return later (§ 7). Again recently, I ended an 
archaeological book of mine, wholly traditional in its form, 
with a few schematisations in the style of fig.1 intended to give 
an idea of the degree of reduction that could be obtained 
without losing any part of its cognitive content. Losses of other 
sorts are of course incurred; their inventory shows that they 
concern parts of the text that fulfil functions other than 
cognitive proper, the utility of which is open to discussion 
(Gardin 1998:167-180). Some readers might wonder at this 
point why I chose to publish some 200 pages of text instead of 
the shorter logicist version. A rapid but on the whole correct 
answer is the strength of tradition, partly on my side, to be 
sure, but as much on the side of most academic  
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Fig.1 The standard “schematisation” of argument in 
archaeological Constructs 
 
institutions and publishers, understandably worried about 
the reception of such innovations. 
Habits are liable to change, however, in the humanities as 
elsewhere, and especially so today, under various pressures 
linked to the computer revolution. First, the computational 
format adopted in logicist versions of archaeological constructs 
is an invitation to consider applications in artificial 
intelligence; for the two components recalled above – data base 
and rewrite formulas – match the structure of knowledge bases 
in expert systems where a similar dichotomy obtains between 
‘facts’ and ‘rules’. This is not the place to summarise the 
lessons of our past experiments in this direction (Gardin et al. 
1987; Francfort 1992), nor the reasons that led us to 
concentrate later our efforts on the subject of archaeological 
publications. Computers are again present in that context, but 
in a different capacity. Their function is to provide an 
electronic support for recording logicist schematisations of 
archaeological theories on web-sites or CD-ROMs. The 
navigational tools of hypertext are then available to consult 
publications of that form in all sorts of ways, depending on the 
degree and type of knowledge required. Pieces of the overall 
construct can be accessed directly, without any need to read a 
long linear discourse in order to locate them. In the same time, 
the overall interpretation process is immediately visible, 
together with the data that support each of its successive steps. 
The example presented at this conference by Valentine Roux is 
an illustration of the gains expected from the condensation of a 
500 pages book, written in traditional discourse, into a logicist 
structure recorded on a CD-ROM. This electronic version is 
sold with the book, so that anyone can assess, qualify or deny 
those gains and hopefully suggest better ways of meeting the 
same goals. The point to keep in mind is that an electronic 
publication of the sort has nothing to do with the digitalisation 
of a printed journal or book: the major innovation lies in the 
rethinking and rewriting of its substance prior its recording on 
a computer (Gardin 1991). 
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I should at this point add a confession, namely that the 
proposed course is to me only a partial answer to the 
information crisis discussed above (§ 2). If, as I believe, the 
deeper source of our ecological problem is demographic 
growth, following P. Joliot’s argument, there might come a 
time when the expanding knowledge networks contemplated 
here will exceed our ability to ‘control’ them fully, in a 
neuronal sense. Changes of quite another sort will then have to 
be envisaged in the organisation and conduct of scientific 
research world-wide, which will have to do more with politics 
than with technology. However, since this paper is expected to 
deal with present issues, I may be excused for going back to 
more immediate concerns, both theoretical and practical. 
5 Relation with current epistemological debates 
The Model/Narrative Duality 
The anticipated evolution of scholarly discourse is not an 
isolated projection confined to archaeology alone. It is 
essentially an extension of a broader debate opened a few years 
ago on the relation between two major ways of accounting for 
human phenomena, past and present: models on the one hand, 
calling at some point on the language of mathematics and 
computers, and narratives on the other, relying mostly on the 
syntax and semantics of natural language. A multidisciplinary 
seminar was organised on this subject by a sociologist, Claude 
Grignon, from 1995 to 2000, culminating in a book published 
last year (Grenier et al., 2001). Its most significant lessons for 
our present concerns are a twofold acknowledgement and an 
open question. (a) The bulk of our knowledge of the past 
comes from the writings of scholars who till recently made 
little or no use of formal models. (b) This knowledge is entitled 
to a scientific status on the same basis as the knowledge 
embodied in mathematical models in so far as it lends itself to 
the two kinds of tests required for the building of science: tests 
of coherence (formal consistency) and tests of correspondence 
(empirical conformity). Critical reviews of historical constructs 
at least seem to take for granted, if implicitly, the relevance of 
such tests in the humanities. (c) Now, the open question: is it 
not therefore tempting to single out in the thread of narrative 
accounts of the past the kind of elements that are questioned in 
such critiques and to regard them as components of underlying 
qualitative models, subject to the same formal and empirical 
refutations as all models, mathematical or other ? In other 
words, are we not likely to find in scholarly publications the 
substance of cognitive models, more or less logically 
articulated (and ‘formal’ in that very loose sense), that 
eventually stand or fall according to the standard criteria of 
science, differing in that respect from the rhetorical discourse 
in which they are traditionally embedded? The logicist program 
is nothing but a tentative answer to that question, among others 
(Gardin 2001b). 
5.2  The Third Culture Option 
One of those alternative answers is a wholesale rejection of 
the question, regarded as out of place in the humanities. The 
arguments are well known; they are mostly variations on the 
theme of an intrinsic difference between natural and human 
phenomena, the orders of Science and Literature, etc. However, 
since there are such things as ‘ human sciences’ or ‘sciences of 
culture’, the problem arises of defining the ways of thought and 
discourse that characterise them, distinct from the ways of 
other scientific disciplines, as well as from those of common 
sense or literature. The solution generally proposed consists in 
postulating a middle mode of reasoning and writing, situated 
somewhere between the two poles of such dichotomies – in 
brief, a Third culture, neither science nor literature or art, 
endowed with its own epistemological status (Lepenies 1985). 
I have raised elsewhere a number of questions regarding this 
intermediate or hybrid genre (Gardin 1990b, 2001a); since the 
organisers of this conference included epistemology in its 
program, I thought I had to mention this other case of a relation 
between the evolution of archaeological discourse envisaged in 
this paper and the ongoing debates on the status of the social 
sciences and humanities. 
5.3  Metatheoretical or Metaphorical Discourse 
An alternative approach of the same matter consists in 
changing the level of our perspective. In the preceding section, 
the argument bore on the possible location of historical 
disciplines between two poles variously described as Science 
and Literature, Formal reasoning and Common sense, etc. Let 
us now rise to a higher standpoint and look for a possible 
characterisation above those two universes of discourse. 
Attempts of that sort have not been lacking in the past 
centuries, under the pen of philosophically oriented scientists 
or scientifically trained philosophers. To make a long story 
short, let us concentrate on the sole case of archaeology. A 
contemporary example of the kind is the call on the perspective 
of semiotics as offering a proper framework for the study of 
our interpretation processes. The logicist program, for one, did 
make reference to that discipline in its early years, through its 
very designation: one of the members of the logicist school 
founded in Vienna by Carnap and others was Charles Morris, 
whose book on The Theory of Signs was cited among our 
sources of inspiration (Gardin 1980:175). In later papers on the 
subject, I again acknowledged that connection, but with an 
emphasis on its essentially metaphorical rather than 
metatheoretical function: the logicist analysis of archaeological 
papers does indeed look at them as symbolic constructs or 
‘systems of signs’ as understood by Charles Morris, but it 
makes no use of the concepts or tools proposed in his 
presentation of semiotics (Gardin 2000). 
References to that (meta)discipline again cropped up 
recently when the Society of American Archaeology included a 
session on “Semiotic Approaches to the Study of Meaning” in 
its 66th annual meeting (2001). C.S. Peirce was abundantly 
cited, his famous triad being proposed as a productive 
framework to explore the meaning of archaeological sites or 
monuments. Other sources were named, from Saussure to 
Foucault, again on the assumption that their findings on the 
linguistic or sociocultural functioning of symbolic systems 
could be fruitfully incorporated into our own ways of making 
sense of archaeological materials. Doubts were expressed on 
this last point, including by the present author, on the ground of 
a possible confusion between metatheoretical and metaphorical 
discourse. However, ideas differ on this matter, as illustrated 
by the fierce reactions of scholars in the social sciences and the 
humanities to Alan Sokal’s famous hoax. All I wish to stress at 
this point is that the issues discussed in the present paper are 
also related to that broad debate. 
The Validation Dilemma 
Yet another epistemological moot point is the place and 
nature of validation processes in archaeology. Opinions have 
varied remarkably over the last fifty years on this crucial 
matter. While the New archaeology insisted on the necessity of 
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empirical tests, said to have been rather neglected before, the 
Post-processual school which followed gradually shifted the 
emphasis on the sociocultural basis of evaluations (Hodder 
1984), ending up with a rejection of the validation concept 
altogether in archaeology (Hodder 1986:13-14). A few years 
later, the pendulum again swung back to empirical 
requirements when, under the auspices of Renfrew’s Cognitive 
archaeology, James Bell presented testability as the founding 
stone of scientific constructs (1994). 
Those oscillations in the archaeological community are a 
reflection of similar hesitations or controversies in the human 
sciences in general. The adepts of Models seem ready to accept 
by and large the ultimate verdict of empirical evidence, as 
universally understood in science, while the authors of 
Narratives are prone to deny its relevance or feasibility in their 
trade, acknowledging instead the primacy of sociocultural 
criteria of evaluation, with their inevitable liability to change 
in time and space. The question which we have to answer is 
then as follows; assuming that archaeological theories belong 
to the intermediate or hybrid genre discussed above (§ 5.2), in 
what way does their transformation into computational 
structures affect our position in this dilemma? 
Logicist positions: a summary 
The relations established between the subject of this paper 
and a number of ongoing epistemological discussions in the 
human sciences invite me to summarise my positions in the 
particular case of archaeology. 
(a) The logicist analysis of archaeological discourse may 
be regarded as metatheoretical in so fas as it applies to 
archaeological theories of any school (processual, marxist, 
post-modern, cognitive, etc.), but it does not call on any 
general theory of interpretation, semiotics or other, beyond the 
standard principles of scientific reasoning. In fact, the reference 
to logicism becomes unnecessary as archaeological theories 
tend to accept the same constraints as other historical 
constructs produced in the natural sciences (geology, 
paleontology, etc.). The literature of prehistory, in particular, 
provides more and more examples of the kind. 
(b)  Schematisations of argument are, according to the 
definition proposed by the Swiss logician J.-B. Grize, “models 
generated by a discourse in natural language”. I would add 
‘conceptual’ models, inasmuch as they express the ways in 
which scholars conceptualise the past on the basis of 
archaeological remains. A distinction should then be made 
from the kind of ‘conceptual modelling’ which computers 
experts have in mind in their efforts to devise a system of 
standard categories that would make it possible to process 
queries through data bases established for different purposes 
and therefore expressed in different though not unrelated 
concepts. The two undertakings pursue separate goals, equally 
worthwhile, but which it would seem difficult to merge into a 
common framework at the present stage. 
(c) The conceptual models derived from the analysis of  
archaeological theories are said to represent their cognitive 
component. As such, they are liable to evaluations according to 
the same criteria as scientific models in general, in part 
empirical, in part sociocultural. The relative weight of the two 
parts varies in time and space, but the long run trend in 
archaeology seems to indicate, ultimately, the precedence of 
the former. 
(d) The elements of archaeological discourse that are left 
over in the schematisation process are taken to represent the 
rhetorical component. It is subject to wholly different criteria 
of value (stylistic, hedonistic, literary, etc.) which also play a 
part in the reception of archaeological theories by particular 
groups – or ‘discursive societies’, in M. Foucault’s perceptive 
terms. 
(e) Those two components are intricately mixed in the 
thread of natural discourse; but there are signs of a move 
towards a separation of the two genres, both necessary for the 
build-up and dissemination of knowledge, but preferably in 
distinct works rather than in the hybrid genre that now prevails. 
(f) The emphasis on the place of literary visions in 
archaeology, next to scientific constructs, was an explicit part 
of the logicist program from the very beginning (Gardin 
1980:178-180). Critics at the time condemned, among other 
things, the ‘inconsistency’ of this conclusion in a book mainly 
concerned with the formal structure of archaeological theories. 
Times have changed, however, and the Models vs. Narrative 
debate (supra, § 5.1) has done much to establish the 
complementary nature of those two ways of knowledge – a 
position already reached years ago by an eminent scholar in 
cognitive psychology (Bruner 1986:11-43). Meanwhile, the 
idea of a third, intermediate genre remains an ill-defined 
option. Fig. 2, read from top down, is a way to represent that 
evolution; it hardly needs any comments, except for its lower 
part which takes us to the dangerous waters of Anticipation – 
the subject of the next and final section. 
5 Back to archaeological publications 
The bottom line in this figure suggests the probable destiny 
of archaeological publications as I see it in a more or less 
distant future. My first assumption is that a vast majority of our 
printed journals and books will continue for quite some time to 
follow the discursive traditions of the Third culture, mixing the 
cognitive and rhetorical “uses of argument” studied by Stephen 
Toulmin throughout his career (1958, 2001). The major factor 
in support of that course is not so much the present efforts 
towards its justification, in epistemological or sociocultural 
terms, as the power of academic institutions attached to that 
traditional form of discourse in the social sciences and the 
humanities. However, a second assumption in fig.2 is that 
various forces are at work in favour of a return to the two 
modes of thought and discourse depicted by Jerome Bruner as 
‘natural kinds’- the ‘logico-scientifc’ mode (Science) and the 
‘narrative’ mode (Literature), in his terminology. 
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Fig.2. Archaeological discourse in the context of the Third culture 
and its possible evolution in the course of time 
Support sometimes comes from the most unexpected 
sources. An eminent advocate of narrativity, Paul Ricoeur, 
widely known for his long-standing defence of hermeneutical 
approaches in the humanities (1969), gave a brilliant 
conference two years ago on “The writing of history and the 
representation of the past” (immediately published: 2000) in 
which he revised drastically several of his former positions – 
e.g. the heterogeneity of the orders of Nature and Culture, the 
condemnation of ‘positivist’ historians, the enforced distinction 
between Explication (natural sciences) and Comprehension 
(human sciences), etc. – ending up with a plea for a stricter 
separation of the cognitive and the ‘scripturaire’ components of 
scholarly discourse. Historians or archaeologists have not yet 
reacted much to this surprising manifesto; I nevertheless 
believe that its relevance to the Third way issue will not escape 
the attention of the next generations of researchers, as other 
considerations lead them to take up similar positions. Valentine 
Roux has gone through those factors of change in her 
contribution to the present volume. Some are material, related 
to the economics of electronic publications, others are 
intellectual, in the logicist perspective; they need not be 
restated here. Let me rather finish with a few words of caution 
regarding the interpretation of the bottom line of fig.2. 
(a) On the left side, the two blocks ‘mathematical’ and 
‘logicist’ come under the general heading ‘SCIENCE’, at the 
top, for the reasons developed in this paper: they both represent 
the formal mode of knowledge, through quantitative and/or 
qualitative models. 
(b) On the right side, the two blocks ‘narrative’ and ‘fiction’ 
come under the general heading ‘LITERATURE’ at the top. 
This term is here understood in a particular sense; it designates 
the unmarked pole of the binary oppositions established by 
Snow or Bruner, apropos of knowledge in general. ‘Literature’ 
thus covers works that have a creative value in amplifying the 
visions of the past provided in ‘Science’; they differ in that 
respect from the ocean of discourse for which no such 
ambitions are claimed.  
(c) A last point to bear in mind is that the various blocks of 
the lower line stand on the same horizontal level. In other 
words, no hierarchy is intended, neither between the left and 
the right half of fig.2, nor between the two blocks named in 
each half. The rationale behind all our distinctions is strictly 
functional. On the left side (SCIENCE), the choice between 
quantitative and qualitative modelling or any combination of 
both in the design of an archaeological construct is left to the 
author; no superior epistemological status is assigned to 
mathematical models. The knowledge produced in such forms 
is for the benefit of researchers alone; it is not meant to satisfy 
the expectations of a broader readership. The right half of fig.2 
(LITERATURE) makes room for publications that take on this 
ambition,  namely, the diffusion of archaeological knowledge 
in the ‘general public’ or any particular subset of that vague 
entity. Works of fiction are therefore part of our ‘literature’ 
inasmuch as they succeed in enlivening the findings of 
archaeological science – or even its very interpretation 
processes… Margaret Conkey’s review of three recent novels 
written by professional archaeologists on that last subject is in 
this respect quite illuminating (2002). 
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